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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
RETAIL RESPONSIBILITY-A REPLY
By JOHN BARKER WAITE*
J APPRECIATE the courtesy of Professor Brown, and the editors
of the MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, in offering me an opportunity
to reply to his article. I suspect that the chief difference between
Professor Brown and myself is a disagreement as to wise public
policy-just as we might or might not disagree concerning the
economic wisdom of federal legislation relating to wages and hours
of labor.
Thoughtful men today concede, I believe, that judges create
legal rules as truly, if not as frankly, as do legislatures.
"Whether the judicial process be philosophically characterized
as ascertainment of preexisting but previously unformulated law,
as application of known law to novel facts, as reshaping of law, as
making of law, or simply and frankly as declaration of choice be-
tween conflicting theories of social interest, the fact remains that
in case after case decision has in truth depended upon judicial
notions of wise public policy.. . . Judicial decision has ceased to
be an ineluctable transcendentalism speaking through the judges;
it is revealed as a very human utterance based on individual ideas
of what is wise."'-
It has been a long accepted rule of lav that the consumer of
canned goods, who has suffered injury through a defect in the
contents, may shift the burden of loss to someone else, whenever,
(1) the injury is attributable to the fault of that someone else, or
(2) when that someone else has undertaken to assume the burden
of injury. The "fault" upon which shifting the burden is thus
predicable is usually characterizable as "negligence." The "as-
sumption" of responsibility for the burden is commonly signified
by use of that vague term "warranty."
Whether there is such an assumption, a "warranty," by virtue
of which to shift the burden is, of course, often a disputable
question. The complications in the problem are manifold. But
as I thought to point out in my previous article, the original, under-
lying idea of "warranty" is a representation, express or implied in
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
'Quoted from my own discussion of Reasonable Search and Research
(1938) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 623, in which I pointed out numerous illustra-
tions. The gist of the article was that, since decision, like legislation.
does thus depend often on choice of socio-economic-political policy, judges,
as well as legislators, should predicate decision on knowledge of actualities
rather than on empirical theory.
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fact, from which either directly or by indirection a liability for its
inaccuracy devolves upon its maker. Regardless of whether the
nature of the liability sounds in contract or in tort, the basis of
the liability-in the original connotation of the word-is an untrue
representation. If one prefers, since "representation" and
.promise" are so often misused interchangeably, "warranty"
connotes a promise. But the point is, that it does connote an actual
promise or actual representation-actual, even though its existence
be deduced by inference from the implications of the situation
without verbal expression. When either "fault" is present, or
"assumption"-in this sense of real though perhaps inferred,
representation-is present, the law has long permitted an injured
consumer to shift his loss. But when neither has been present, it
was not the policy of judicial decision, until recently, to transfer
the loss from the consumer's shoulders to those of another.
Parenthetically, may I here enthusiastically repudiate the im-
plications of Professor Brown's statement that "Professor Waite's
theory that a retailer should not be liable except for personal
negligence entirely wipes out the whole doctrine of warranty in the
law of sales." I have promulgated no such theory! I appreciate
Professor Brown's restraint in not belaboring me vigorously when
he assumes that I take that position. It would be an absurd
proposition, of course. What I do say is, that without negligence
or warranty, in the original connotation of that term, the retailer
should not be liable. But Heaven forbid that by my ipse dixit I
should seek to wipe out warranties.
I do agree with Professor Brown that of late both the retailer
and the manufacturer have been made liable by the courts, even
when there was neither fault nor real representation-warranty.
In fact that long unprecedented liability is what evoked my original
article. In respect to the manufacturer, this new liability is im-
posed upon him sometimes under the terminology of "res ipsa
loquitur ;" sometimes, as in Parks v. Yost Pie Company-,2 upon a
theory that manufacturers of foodstuffs, at least ought to be
treated more or less as insurers of its suitability-the reason for
such a policy not being expounded.
So too, retailers who are in no way at fault, and who can not
rationally be pretended to have assumed a liability, have had
liability nevertheless thrust upon them of late. Sometimes the
process of imposition has been a bald-or should we call it bold-
"(1914) 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202: "Practically, he must know it is
fit or take the consequences if it proves destructive."
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use of the four-term fallacy in logic. "A retailer who warrants-
in the sense of represents expressly or by implication-has always
been liable. This retailer did warrant-in the sense of making a
sale. Therefore he is liable." Possibly there is no great harm in
such law-making, superficially concealed by mutation in termin-
ology. As King Pausole said in justification of wearing his more
comfortable imitation crown, anyone intelligent enough to
recognize it as an imitation would realize that any crown is a false
pretense. No sophisticated person is apt to be fooled by the new
guise of "warranty" into believing that the old law of liability
based either on fault or assumption is being adhered to. But what
good the fiction serves is open to question.
Other courts in imposing the liability upon the retailer as a
matter of status, regardless of fault or assumption, have been rather
more frank. One case3 simply says that "public safety demands"
such a liability-i.e., that the law shall "imply a warranty."'  An-
other5 assumes that the retailer's liability is "absolute and rests in
its ultimate basis in large part upon the necessity for public protec-
tion." But none of these courts points out wherein this "public
necessity" resides.
And there you have the point of disagreement between Pro-
fessor Brown and myself. I have never been able to discover
sufficient justification in economics, sociology, politics, or any
utilitarian consideration, for the public policy of making the re-
tailer liable merely because of his status, without either fault or
warranty, in its original sense, on his part. Professor Brown
believes that it is a wise policy. We probably disagree, amicably,
about the practical wisdom of much other legislation. And in this
particular instance I must concede that judges in increasing num-
ber, for reasons which they successfully keep to themselves, are
following Professor Brown's ideas of socio-economic wisdom
rather than mine.
3Chapman v. Roggenkamp, (1913) 182 Ill. App. 117.4Which, of course, in any conventionally correct use of English, is
wholly different from saying that the seller has implied a warranty, e. g.
has so acted that a representation can fairly be inferred by the court.
5Cushing v. Rodman, (1936) 65 App. D. C. 258, 82 F. (2d) 864, 104 A.
L. R. 1023.6Moreover I note that the courts have now hooked the wholesaler into
the liability-based-on-public-policy scheme. See for example Schwengel
v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., (1938) 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. (2d) 930.
They do it, to be sure, under the false pretense of an "implied" warranty-
or would it be more diplomatic to say the "modernized" significance of the
term ?-but they talk utilities even if they do not analyze them.
Perhaps some one will try the delivery boy next. It might be difficult
to get him into the warranty verbiage, but what about "actual cause, proxi-
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Even though I concede that the courts, for their own cryptic
reasons, do seem to be following Prof. Brown's postulate that
some wise public policy makes it desirable to let injured consumer
shift the burden of loss to non-negligent and, in the original sense,
non-warranting retailers, perhaps I ought to take issue with him
on his implicit proposition that the same reasons for the policy
do not apply to "servers" of food, nor to sellers of things other
than food. It is a bit difficult to argue the proper breadth of ap-
plication of the reasons in the absence of some clear premise
of what those reasons are. But I submit that if, openly, or under
cover of a mutation in the connotation of "warranty", a retailer
of food ought to be held liable to consumers, without fault or as-
sumption and merely because of his status, then retailers of other
products and servers of food ought also to be held liable because
of a similarity in status.
mate or efficient cause, negligent causation, duty to avoid negligence in
respect to the injured person, forseeability ?" H6 would seem to fit there-
in, except, obviously, for the negligence requirement, and that did not
greatly perturb judges who thought the non-negligent retailer really ought to
hear the burden of loss. I am sure that some philosophy to support it could
be found in Mr. Cowan's highly instructive, and diverting, The Victim of the
Law of Torts, (1939) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 532. And as for the utilities-the
delivery boy is even nearer to the consumer than is the retailer!
